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The	  declaration	  of	  the	  one	  who	  professes	  is	  a	  performative	  declaration	  in	  some	   way.	   It	   pledges	   like	   an	   act	   of	   sworn	   faith,	   an	   oath,	   a	   testimony,	   a	  manifestation,	  an	  attestation,	  or	  a	  promise,	  a	  commitment.	  To	  profess	  is	  to	  make	  a	  pledge	  while	  committing	  one’s	  responsibility.	  ‘To	  make	  profession	  of’	  is	  to	  declare	  out	  loud	  what	  one	  is,	  what	  one	  believes,	  what	  one	  wants	  to	  be,	  while	  asking	  another	  to	  take	  one’s	  word	  and	  believe	  this	  declaration.	  Jacques	  Derrida1	  	  This	  is	  a	  profession	  of	  faith.	  For	  three	  years,	  I	  have	  been	  researching	  Buddhism	  and	  poststructuralist	   theories	   on	   knowledge,	   self	   and	   ethics	   in	   order	   to	   articulate	   the	  ethico-­‐political	   implications	   of	   my	   practice	   of	   Vipassana	   (a	   form	   of	   Buddhist	  meditation)	  and	  interrogate	  what	  is	  called	  the	  politics	  of	  spirituality.2	  Propelling	  this	  autoethnographic	   project	   is	   a	   question	   of	   faith.	   Yet,	   I’ve	   been	   uncomfortable	   and	  
afraid	   of	   articulating	   this	   outright.	   Why?	   Much	   of	   the	   discomfort	   stems	   from	   the	  tensions	   constituting	   my	   subjectivity	   as	   a	   religiously	   committed	   Buddhist	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attempting	   to	   understand	   my	   faith	   with	   and	   through	   the	   secular	   discourses	   of	  cultural	  studies.	  Perhaps	  I’m	  afraid	  of	  the	  disapproval,	  or	  even	  ridicule	  I	  might	  face	  in	  professing	  the	  religious	  inspiration	  I	  bring	  to	  and	  discover	  through	  academia.	  But	  can’t	   this	   commitment	   to	   knowledge	   also	   be	  hospitable	   to	   faith,	   and	   therefore	   the	  possibility	   that	   religion	   or	   spiritual	   pursuits	  may	   have	   crucial	   things	   to	   say	   about	  those	  conundrums	  we	  grapple	  with,	  like	  ethics,	  (inter)subjectivity	  and	  the	  body?	  In	  tackling	   these	   conundrums	  with	   Buddhism	   and	   poststructuralist	   thought,	   I	   find	   it	  irresponsible	   to	   pretend	   that	   faith	   does	   not	   also	   support	   my	   practice	   of	   cultural	  studies.	  Hence,	  by	  way	  of	  an	  analysis	  this	  essay	  makes	  a	  profession	  of	  faith.	  The	   essay	   first	   contextualises	   the	   discursive	   fields	   shaping	   this	   profession	  before	  analysing	  Vipassana	  with	  a	  ‘religious’	  Foucauldian	  approach	  oriented	  around	  the	   critico-­‐political	   aims	   of	   his	   late	   work.	   This	   will	   elucidate	   how	   Buddhist	   and	  poststructuralist	  thought	  share	  certain	  concerns,	  and	  identify	  trajectories	  for	  further	  inquiry.	  The	  primary	  aim	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  faith	  within	  cultural	  studies,	  if	  not	  the	   academy	   more	   generally.	   My	   understanding	   of	   faith	   is	   partly	   informed	   by	  Buddhism,	   but	   I	   do	   not	   conflate	   faith	   with	   institutional	   or	   doctrinal	   religious	  commitment.3	   Rather,	   I’m	   adopting	   a	   deconstructive	   strategy	   to	   decentre	   this	  reductionistic	   understanding	   of	   faith,	   exploring	   it	   as	   an	   affective	   response	   that	   is	  irreducible	  to	  any	  ontotheological	  proposition,	  and	  which	  reverberates	  through	  the	  hopes	   and	   aspirations	   of	   ‘believers’	   and	   ‘nonbelievers’	   alike.	   Hence,	   a	   pre-­‐established	   definition	   of	   faith	   is	   suspended	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   hypothetical	   question.	  Recognising	   its	  resonance	  with	  affirmations	  of	  relationality	   like	   ‘trust’,	   ‘confidence’	  and	   ‘fidelity’,	   I	   ask:	   ‘Might	   it	   be	   that	   faith	   is	   betrothed	   to	   an	   open	   question,	   the	  movements	  of	  an	  ongoing	  task?’	  
—CONTEXTUALISING THE PROFESSION	  Vipassana	   serves	   as	   a	   case	   study,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   representative	   of	   Buddhism	   as	   a	  whole,	  which	  far	  from	  being	  a	  monolith	  involves	  a	  diversity	  of	  knowledge	  practices	  from	  different	  sociocultural	  contexts.	  Nonetheless,	   it	  does	  reflect	  distinctive	  trends	  of	  ‘Buddhist	  modernism’,	  an	  ongoing	  process	  whereby	  the	  varied	  forms	  of	  Buddhism	  are	   attuned	   to	   the	   cultural	   and	   intellectual	   understandings	   of	   its	   historical	  milieu.	  Developing	   out	   of	   this	   process	   are	   detraditionalised	   and	   demythologised	  representations	  of	  Buddhism	  that	  emphasise	  the	  ethical	  and	  philosophical	  over	  the	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religious,	   and	   foreground	  meditation	   as	   a	   central	   practice.4	   Vipassana	   is	   one	   such	  representation.5	   While	   it	   shares	   the	   doctrinal	   lineage	   of	   Theravada	   Buddhism	  (practiced	  predominantly	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Southeast	  Asia),	   its	  founder	  S.N.	  Goenka	  disavows	  the	  label	  ‘Buddhism’,	  describing	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  as	  ‘the	  art	  of	  living’	  and	  meditation	   as	   a	   ‘non-­‐sectarian	   technique’	   of	   ‘self	   transformation	   through	   self-­‐observation’.6	  My	  research	  is	  situated	  on	  the	  same	  historical	  continuum	  of	  Buddhist	  modernism	  and	  aims	  to	  elucidate	  the	  contributions	  of	  Buddhism	  to	  current	  ethico-­‐political	   issues	   with	   Foucauldian	   critique,	   thereby	   extending	   upon	   existing	  scholarship	   that	   focuses	   on	   Buddhist	   and	   Derridean	   philosophy.7	   In	   particular,	   it	  uses	  Vipassana	  to	  build	  on	  studies	  of	  the	  ‘religious’	  dimensions	  of	  Foucault’s	  work.8	  	  Jeremy	   Carrette	   argues	   that	   Foucault	   had	   always	   been	   concerned,	   if	   only	  implicitly,	   with	   the	   intersections	   between	   religion	   and	   culture,	   unearthing	   in	   his	  oeuvre	   ‘spiritual	   corporality’	   and	   ‘political	   spirituality’,	   the	   twin	   modalities	   of	  Foucault’s	   ‘religious	   question’.	   Spiritual	   corporality	   turns	   on	   Foucault’s	   analysis	   of	  the	  body	  as	  both	  the	  effect	  and	  vehicle	  of	  power.	  This,	  Carrette	  contends,	  eliminates	  the	   persistent	   theological	   dualism	   of	   soul	   and	   body,	   spirit	   and	   matter,	   such	   that	  religious	  ideas	  ‘become	  ways	  of	  expressing	  the	  body	  which	  can	  be	  both	  a	  technology	  of	   domination	   and	  a	  more	   positive	   technology	   of	   self’.9	   Political	   spirituality,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   turns	   on	   Foucault’s	   working	   definition	   of	   spirituality	   as	   ‘a	   subject	  acceding	   to	   a	   certain	   mode	   of	   being’,10	   and	   is	   described	   by	   him	   as	   ‘the	   will	   to	  discover	  a	  different	  way	  of	  governing	  oneself	  through	  a	  different	  way	  of	  dividing	  up	  true	  and	  false’.11	  Political	  spirituality	  facilitates	  the	  interrogation	  of	  ‘the	  government	  of	  truth’.	  For	  Carrette,	  it	  cross-­‐modulates	  the	  ‘spiritual’,	   ‘ethical’,	  and	  ‘political’	  with	  ‘truth’,	   ‘subjectivity’	   and	   ‘power’,12	   functioning	   as	   both	   an	   analytical	   tool	   and	  strategy	   of	   self-­‐constitution	   for	   negotiating	   the	   politics	   of	   subjectivity:	   as	   both	  ‘subject	   to	   someone	   else	   by	   control	   and	   dependence’,	   and	   an	   ‘identity	   by	   a	  conscience	   and	   self-­‐knowledge’.13	   While	   there	   is	   a	   decisive	   shift	   from	   ‘power’	   to	  ‘subject’	  and	  ‘ethics’	  in	  his	  late	  work,	  ‘Foucault	  does	  not	  abandon	  politics	  to	  dedicate	  himself	   to	   ethics,	   but	   complicates	   the	   study	   of	   governmentalities	   through	   the	  exploration	  of	   the	   care	  of	   the	   self	  …	  ethics,	   or	   the	   subject,	   is	  not	   thought	  of	   as	   the	  other	  of	  politics	  or	  power’.14	  	  The	   Foucauldian	   knowledge–power–subjectivity	   schema	   is	   of	   course	   widely	  adopted	   in	   cultural	   studies’	   interdisciplinary	   investigations	   of	   the	   micro-­‐politics	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constituting	  everyday	  life,	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  discourses	  and	  practices	  of	   consumer	   culture.	  My	  work	   adapts	   the	   approaches	   developed	   in	   this	   strand	   of	  cultural	   studies,	   particularly	   those	   that	   do	  not	   focus	   exclusively	   on	   the	   ideological	  imperatives	   circumscribing	   popular	   cultural	   formations	   but	   also	   explore	   their	  counter-­‐hegemonic	   potentials	   and/or	   contributions	   to	   academia.15	   Religion	   and	  spirituality,	   however,	   have	   not	   been	   treated	   with	   the	   same	   hospitality.	   Where	  attention	   is	   given	   to	   them,	   studies	   have	   tended	   to	   view	   them	   with	   suspicion,	  adapting	   for	   instance	   Nikolas	   Rose’s	   Foucauldian-­‐inflected	   thesis	   about	   the	   ‘psy	  matrix’	  to	  criticise	  them	  as	  the	  technologies	  of	  neoliberal	  governmentality	  (though	  it	  is	   worth	   noting	   that	   Rose	   himself	   cautions	   against	   performing	   only	   sceptical	   or	  paranoid	  assessments).16	   Jay	   Johnston	  and	  Ruth	  Barcan	  have	   identified	   limitations	  with	   such	   studies.17	   They	   ask	   if	   they	   mire	   cultural	   studies	   in	   ‘the	   programmatic	  pessimism	   of	   Foucauldian	   accounts	   of	   selfhood’,	   if	   their	   ‘foundational	   secularism’	  marginalises	   ‘both	   the	   bodily	   experiences	   and	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	   body’	   found	   in	  religion	  and	   spirituality,	  which	   could	   in	   fact	   enrich	   critical	   inquiries.18	  Hence,	   they	  propose	  ‘augmentation	  and	  enrichment’	  to	  the	  Foucauldian	  approach	  (‘in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  so	  much	  contradict	   it	  as	  shift	   its	  analytical	   focus’)	   to	  enable	   ‘a	  rethinking	  of	  notions	   of	   spirit’,	   the	   ‘re-­‐theorising	   [of]	   the	   mind/body	   split	   and	   the	   nature	   of	  matter’.19	  	  My	  analysis	  of	  Vipassana	  adopts	  the	   ‘religious’	  Foucauldian	  approach	  outlined	  above	  which	   offers	   a	   way	   forward	   that	   is	  mindful	   of	   the	   corporeality	   and	   critical	  contributions	   of	   religious	   or	   spiritual	   knowledge	   practices.	   This	   approach	   doesn’t	  neglect	   or	   contradict	   criticisms	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   imperatives	   circumscribing	  ‘spirituality’,	   an	   important	   political	   intervention	   that	   must	   be	   sustained.	   In	   this	  regard,	  Guy	  Redden’s	  contribution	  to	  this	  issue	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  Review	  presents	  a	  cogent	   argument	   for	   developing	   research	   on	   the	   market	   logics	   shaping	   the	  knowledge	  production	  of	  New	  Age	  spirituality	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  broader	  questions	  about	  religion	  and	  society.20	  The	  analysis	  of	  Vipassana	  will	  foreground	  the	  ethics	  of	  cultural	   studies	   and	   extrapolate	   on	   how	   it	   involves	   faith.	   Here,	   a	   deconstructive	  strategy	   becomes	   crucial.	   Joanna	   Zylinska	   has	   elaborated	   from	   the	   premises	   of	  ‘performativity’	   and	   ‘undecidability’	   a	   two-­‐pronged	   argument:	   that	   ‘the	   political	  commitment	  of	  cultural	  studies	  already	  works	  against	  a	  certain	  normative	  horizon’,	  and	  that	  ‘its	  numerous	  acts	  of	  political	  practice	  simultaneously	  perform,	  propose	  and	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develop	   an	   ethics	   of	   cultural	   studies’.21	   Refracting	   Levinasian	   ethics	   through	  Derrida’s	   arguments	   about	   possible–impossible	   aporias	   like	   l’avenir	   and	  messianicity,	   Zylinska	   articulates	   cultural	   studies	   as	   a	   ‘responsible	   response’	   that	  adopts	   a	   foundational	   aim	   of	   responding	   to	   difference	   and	   to	   what	   calls	   for	  recognition	   and	   respect.	   As	   ‘an	   ethical	   opening	   to	   incalculable	   alterity’,	   it	   is	   ‘a	  project-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making,	  on	   its	  way’,	  and	  can	   ‘never	  be	  properly	   founded’.22	  She	   thus	  characterises	  cultural	  studies	  in	  Derridean	  terms	  as	  ‘a	  promise	  …	  a	  messianic	  project	  of	   awaiting	   the	   unknown	   and	   the	   not-­‐yet,	   of	   opening	   ourselves	   not	   only	   to	   the	  differences	   we	   already	   know	   and	   can	   name	   but	   also	   to	   those	   that	   remain	  unnameable	  and	  unidentifiable,	  to	  what	  may	  yet	  surprise	  and	  scare	  us’.23	  	  Zylinska	  doesn’t	  broach	  the	  topic	  of	  faith,	  but	  the	  aporias	  she	  engages	  with	  are	  the	   same	   ones	   informing	  Derrida’s	   argument	   about	   a	   ‘fiduciary	   act’	   between	   faith	  and	   knowledge,	   religion	   and	   reason,	   about	   the	   impossibility	   of	   placing	   one	   before	  the	   other.24	   If	   knowledge	   is	   always-­‐already	   marked	   by	   the	   trace	   of	   faith,	   is	   a	  responsible	  response—the	  promise	  of	  cultural	  studies—an	  impassioned	  call	  for	  and	  
of	  faith,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  more	  hospitable	  encounter	  with	  faith?	  What	  if	  the	  movement	  of	  
faith	  indeed	  accompanies	  and	  spurs	  us	  on	  to	  do	  what	  we	  do?	  	  
—ARTS OF LIVING Vipassana	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  Buddhist	  concept	  of	  vipassanā,	  meaning	  ‘to	  see	  things	  as	   they	   are’	   or	   ‘insight’.	   The	   meditator	   first	   develops	   awareness	   of	   breathing	   to	  cultivate	   what	   is	   called	   mindfulness,	   an	   attitudinal	   and	   perceptual	   practice	   of	  equanimous	  attentiveness.	  The	  meditator	  then	  turns	  awareness	  towards	  the	  body	  to	  contemplate	   on	   vedanā,	   a	   term	   connoting	   both	   ‘bare	   feelings’	   (what	   I	   interpret	   in	  current	  theoretical	  terms	  as	  affect)	  and	  physical	  sensations,	  the	  latter	  serving	  as	  the	  primary	   object	   of	   meditation.	   With	   mindfulness	   the	   meditator	   perceives	   various	  sensations	  throughout	  the	  body,	  even	  very	  subtle	  ones	  that	  weren’t	  apparent	  before.	  Goenka	   claims	   that	   sensations	   can	   neither	   be	   controlled	   nor	   willed.	   Hence,	   one	  should	   not	   seek	   any	  particular	   sensation	   but	   recognise	   that	   all	   sensations—which	  according	   to	  Buddhist	  scriptures	  are	  experienced	  either	  as	  pleasant,	  unpleasant	  or	  neutral—arise	  only	  to	  pass	  away.	  	  Vipassana	   provides	   a	   means	   for	   understanding	   in	   and	   through	   the	   body	   the	  interrelated	   Buddhist	   doctrines	   of	   anicca	   (impermanence/change),	   dukkha	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(existential	   discontent)	   and	  anattā	   (not-­‐self).	   The	   doctrines	   posit	   that	   existence	   is	  impermanent	   because	   all	   conditions	   pass	   away	   when	   their	   supporting	   conditions	  change.	   If	   all	   phenomena	   are	   contingent	   upon	   other	   phenomena	   ad	   infinitum,	  presence	   can	   never	   be	   fully	   secured	   nor	   can	   any	   phenomenon	   be	   said	   to	   have	   an	  intrinsic	  essence,	  especially	  the	  self,	  hence	  not-­‐self—which,	  given	  a	  Derridean	  gloss,	  regards	  the	  transcendental	  subject	  as	  a	  trail	  of	  ungraspable	  traces	  of	  traces.	  Goenka	  claims	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   fully	   recognise	   the	   reality	   of	   impermanence	   and	  concomitant	   delusions	   about	   an	   enduring	   self-­‐essence	   (including	   the	   belief	   in	   an	  enduring,	  originary	  soul-­‐essence)	  perpetuates	  existential	  discontent.	  Therefore,	  the	  crux	  of	  Vipassana	  is	  to	  cultivate	  equanimity	  so	  as	  to	  relinquish	  the	  futile	  craving	  for,	  and	  aversion	  towards,	  whatever	  threatens	  fixity	  in	  one’s	  life	  and	  the	  obstinate	  desire	  for	   self-­‐presence.	   Goenka	   constantly	   reminds	   students	   to	   neither	   relate	   to	  pleasantness	   with	   craving	   nor	   unpleasantness	   with	   aversion,	   enjoining	   them	   to	  always	  ‘start	  again’	  without	  frustration	  whenever	  attention	  wavers	  from	  the	  task	  at	  hand.	  With	   equanimity,	   one	   would	   perceive	   with	   increasing	   clarity	   the	   body	   as	   a	  field	  of	  changing	  sensations,	  developing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  thoughts,	  which	  reveal	  themselves	  to	  be	  just	  as	  ephemeral	  and	  insubstantial.	  Goenka	  illustrates	  the	  everyday	  effects	  of	  the	  practice	  with	  the	  following	  scenario.	  	  Consider	   how	   we	   tend	   to	   lose	   our	   temper	   when	   confronted	   with	   a	   difficult	  situation,	   even	   though	  we	   tell	   ourselves	  we	   shouldn’t.	   Often,	  we	   even	   project	   our	  displeasure	   onto	   others	   or	   external	   situations.	   Vipassana	   teaches	   that	   every	  emotional-­‐mental	  state	  has	  concomitant	  bodily	  sensations.	  Mindfulness	  would	  allow	  one	   to	   observe	   the	   sensations	   (of	   heat,	   for	   instance)	   accompanying	   anger	   and	  cultivate	   insight	   into	   the	   self	   ‘as	   it	   is’:	  an	   impersonal	   interplay	  of	   perception,	   affect,	  
sensation,	  and	  thought	  conditioned	  by	  prior	  experience	  and	  not	  as	  ‘I’,	   ‘me’	  or	  ‘mine’—to	   again	   give	   this	   a	  Derridean	   gloss,	   the	  processes	   constituting	   the	  body-­‐mind	   are	  recognised	  as	  endlessly	  differing	  and	  deferring.	  In	  other	  words,	  we’d	  see	  that	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  react	  angrily	  because	  there	  is	  no	  necessity	  or	  inevitability	  for	  ‘anger’	  or	  the	  self-­‐identity	  of	  ‘angry	  person’.	  Inasmuch	  as	  we	  maintain	  a	  degree	  of	  mindfulness	  and	  equanimity,	  we	  enact	  freedom,	  clearing	  a	  space	  for	  becoming	  otherwise.	  	  Granted,	   the	   relationships	   between	   perception,	   affect,	   sensation,	   thought	   and	  selfhood	   could	   be	   more	   complex	   than	   is	   suggested	   here.	   But	   I	   want	   to	   stay	   with	  Goenka’s	   scenario	   to	   explore	   the	   affinities	   between	   Vipassana	   and	   Foucauldian	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thought.	  Vipassana	  appears	  to	  exemplify	  what	  Foucault	  examines	  in	  his	  late	  work	  on	  the	   Classical	   Greek	   ideal	   of	   an	   art	   of	   living:	   technologies	   of	   the	   self,	   knowledge	  practices	   that	   ‘permit	   individuals	   to	  effect	  by	   their	  own	  means	  or	  with	   the	  help	  of	  others	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   operations	   on	   their	   own	   bodies	   and	   souls,	   thoughts,	  conduct,	   and	   ways	   of	   being,	   so	   as	   to	   transform	   themselves	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   a	  certain	  state	  of	  happiness,	  purity,	  wisdom,	  perfection,	  or	  immortality’.25	  What	  points	  of	  consonance	  might	  a	  Buddhist	  art	  of	  living	  share	  with	  a	  Foucauldian-­‐inflected	  one?	  Timothy	   O’Leary	   has	   argued	   that	   Foucault’s	   ‘genealogy	   of	   ethics’	   seeks	   to	  inaugurate	  new	  modes	  of	  being	  which	  might	  displace	  existing	  relationships	  between	  truth,	   power	   and	   subjectivity.26	   Building	   on	   Foucault’s	   fourfold	   analysis	   of	   ethical	  substance,	  mode	  of	  subjection,	  ethical	  work	  and	   telos—the	   ‘what’,	   ‘why’,	   ‘how’	  and	  ‘goal’	   of	   ethics—O’Leary	  makes	   the	   following	   proposals	   for	   a	   contemporary	   art	   of	  living.27	  First,	   insofar	  as	  Foucault’s	   ‘critical	  attitude’	  regards	  the	  subject	  as	  no	  more	  than	   a	   ‘fictitious	   unity’,	   much	   like	   how	   ‘sex’	   is	   no	   more	   than	   an	   ‘ideal	   point’	  consolidated	   by	   the	   discourses	   of	   sexuality,	   the	   ethical	   substance	   is	   the	  transcendental	  subject	  which	  must	  be	  refused.28	  Second,	   if	  the	  self	   is	  not	  a	  product	  but	   a	   process,	   the	  mode	   of	   subjection	   is	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   unknown	   open-­‐endedness	  of	  existence	  has	  to	  be	  embraced	  with	  an	  attitude	  that	  treats	  life	  as	  an	  art	  of	  ongoing	  crafting.	  Third,	  insofar	  as	  Foucault’s	  critico-­‐political	  project	  aims	  ‘to	  prise	  open	  the	  relations	  of	  truth-­‐power-­‐subjectivity	  which	  makes	  us	  the	  kind	  of	  individual	  that	  we	  are’,	  the	  ethical	  work	  involves	  practices	  of	  desubjectivation.29	  Fourth,	  if	  the	  task	  of	  critique	  is	  not	  to	  remove	  constraint	  or	  domination	  but	  to	  continuously	  open	  up	   possibilities	   for	   new	   sociopolitical	   choices	   and	   relations,	   the	   telos	   is	   freedom,	  conceived	  not	  as	  an	  historical	  constant	  or	  ideal	  state	  but	  as	  constituted	  by	  relations,	  as	   the	  capacity	   to	  say	  no	   to	  a	  certain	   identity	  or	   to	  be	  governed	  a	  certain	  way:	   the	  freedom	  to	  always	  become	  otherwise.	  	  Following	   Foucault’s	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   precept	   of	   ‘the	   care	   of	   self’	   in	   the	  history	   of	   Western	   thought,	   O’Leary	   offers	   philosophy-­‐as-­‐a-­‐way-­‐of-­‐life	   as	   one	  technique	   for	   a	   contemporary	   art	   of	   living.30	   But	   given	   that	   Foucault	   identifies	  spiritual	   askesis	   as	   a	   modality	   of	   the	   care	   of	   self,	   Vipassana	   could	   be	   another	  technique.31	   Treating	   subjectivity	   as	   a	   process,	   Vipassana	   shares	   Foucault’s	   aim	  of	  ‘refusing	  the	  self’.	  Moreover,	  insofar	  as	  mindfulness	  enables	  a	  different	  relationship	  to	  thought	  it	  is	  consonant	  with	  Foucault’s	  understanding	  of	  critique,	  which	  ‘consists	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in	  seeing	  what	  kinds	  of	  self-­‐evidences,	   liberties,	  acquired	  and	  non-­‐reflective	  modes	  of	  thought,	  the	  practices	  we	  accept	  rest	  on’.32	  Foucault	  says:	  ‘Criticism	  consists	  in	  …	  showing	  that	  things	  are	  not	  as	  obvious	  as	  we	  might	  believe,	  doing	   it	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  what	  we	  accept	  as	  going	  without	  saying	  no	  longer	  goes	  without	  saying.’33	  What	  is	   rendered	   difficult	   to	   ‘go	   without	   saying’	   in	   Vipassana	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   an	  unchanging	   ‘I’,	   and	   if,	   as	   David	   Hoy	   suggests,	   Foucault’s	   critico-­‐political	   aim	   is	   to	  bring	  people	  up	   against	   ‘a	   limit-­‐experience	   that	  disrupts	   their	  deepest	   convictions	  and	  sense	  of	  who	  they	  are’,	  Vipassana	  is	  geared	  towards	  a	  similar	  goal,	  revealing	  the	  body-­‐mind	  to	  be	  always	  already	  liminal:	  anicca	  and	  anattā.	  	  Vipassana	   can	   therefore	   be	   read	   as	   a	   practice	   of	   desubjectivation.	   Foucault	  describes	   the	   desired	   effect	   of	   desubjectivation	   as	   se	   dépendre	   de	   soi-­même,	   an	  expression	   usually	   translated	   as	   ‘distancing	   oneself	   from	   oneself’	   or	   ‘detaching	  oneself	  from	  oneself’,	  though	  Hoy	  renders	  it	  as	  ‘dissolving	  oneself’.34	  This	  coincides	  with	  Vipassana	  where	  it	  is	  said	  that	  with	  finely	  honed	  mindfulness	  and	  equanimity	  the	  perceived	  solidity	  of	  the	  body	  would	  dissolve	  into	  a	  boundless	  field	  of	  vibrations,	  a	   direct	   intuition	   of	   anicca	   and	   anattā	   that	   would	   radically	   re-­‐orientate	   one’s	  subjectivity.	   It	   is	   difficult,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   to	   objectively	   validate	   this	   claim.	  Regardless,	   the	   general	   aim	   of	   Vipassana	   to	   disrupt	   delusions	   about	   an	   enduring	  self-­‐essence	  is	  consonant	  with	  the	  Foucauldian	  aim	  of	  ‘dissolving	  oneself’.	  Another	  point	   of	   consonance	   is	   their	   non-­‐essentialising	   approach	   to	   freedom.	  While	  Buddhist	  discourses	  position	  nibbāna	  (Sanskrit:	  nirvāna)	  or	  Awakening	  as	  an	  end	  to	  strive	  for,	  they	  also	  mitigate	  against	  any	  essentialising	  understanding	  of	  the	  goal.	   Hence,	   Goenka	   cautions	   that	   while	   Awakening	   involves	   full	   liberation	   from	  
dukkha,	   to	   crave	  or	  harbour	   expectations	   about	   it	   is	   to	   set	   oneself	   in	   the	  opposite	  direction.	  Awakening	   is	   thus	  suspended—like	  a	   ‘perhaps’—in	   favour	  of	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  transforming	  one’s	  life	  with	  Buddhist	  ethical	  precepts	  and	  practice.	  Like	  Foucault’s	   critico-­‐political	   project,	   Vipassana	   pursues	   freedom	   as	   a	   ‘continuous	  practice	   of	   an	   art	   of	   living’.35	   The	   ceaseless	   movement	   of	   anicca	  (impermanence/change)	   and	   the	   ‘not’	   of	   anattā	   (not-­‐self)	   suggest	   that	   what	  Buddhist	  practice	  requires	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  waiting	  directed	  not	  at	  any	  particular	  object	  but	  for	  the	  ‘outside’:	  reality	  ‘as	  it	  is’	  with	  which	  language	  may	  perhaps	  never	  know	  or	  be	  certain	   if	   it	   coincides.	  Foucault’s	  musing	  about	   language	  offers	  a	   fitting	  allegory	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for	   the	   practice	   of	   mindfulness,	   the	   Buddhist	   commitment	   to	   unconditionally	  Awaken	  to	  reality	  ‘as	  it	  is’:	  	  Language	  in	  its	  every	  word,	  is	  indeed	  directed	  at	  contents	  that	  preexist	  it;	  but	  in	  its	  own	  being,	  provided	  that	  it	  holds	  as	  close	  to	  its	  being	  as	  possible,	  it	  only	  unfolds	   in	   the	  pureness	  of	   the	  wait.	  Waiting	   is	  directed	  at	  nothing:	  any	  object	  that	  could	  gratify	  it	  would	  only	  efface	  it.	  Still,	   it	  is	  not	  confined	  to	   one	   place,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   resigned	   immobility;	   it	   has	   the	   endurance	   of	   a	  movement	  that	  will	  never	  end	  and	  would	  never	  promise	  itself	  the	  reward	  of	   rest;	   it	   does	   not	   wrap	   itself	   in	   interiority;	   all	   of	   it	   falls	   irremediably	  outside.	  Waiting	  cannot	  wait	  for	  itself	  at	  the	  end	  of	  its	  own	  past,	  nor	  rejoice	  in	  its	  own	  practice,	  nor	  steel	  itself	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  for	  it	  was	  never	  lacking	  courage.	  What	  takes	  it	  up	  is	  not	  memory	  but	  forgetting.	  This	  forgetting	  …	  is	  extreme	  attentiveness.	  36	  Vipassana	   involves	   equanimous	   attentiveness	   towards	   the	   liminality	   of	   the	  bios,	   a	  practice	   described	   as	   ‘the	   art	   of	   living’.	   Foucault’s	   critical	   ontology	   of	   the	   present	  involves	   extreme	   attentiveness	   towards	   the	   ‘limits	   of	   ourselves’,37	   a	   practice	  prompting	  these	  comments	  about	  an	  aesthetics	  of	  existence:	  ‘The	  idea	  of	  the	  bios	  as	  a	  material	  for	  an	  aesthetic	  piece	  of	  art	  is	  something	  which	  fascinates	  me.’38	  To	  these	  ends,	  this	  short	  analysis	  has	  outlined	  how	  a	   ‘religious’	  Foucauldian	  approach	  could	  mobilise	   practices	   like	   Vipassana	   as	   ethically	   and	   politically	   enabling	   rather	   than	  politically	  conservative	  or	  ideologically	  complicit—and	  I	  hope	  it	  has	  opened	  lines	  of	  dialogue	   between	   cultural	   studies,	   Buddhist	   communities	   and	   scholarship,	   and	  religion	  more	  generally.	  But	   to	  engage	   in	  dialogue	  questions	  about	   faith	  cannot	  be	  ignored,	  not	  if	  we	  are	  to	  make	  a	  responsible	  response	  towards	  religion.	  	  
—AWAITING IN FAITH, PERHAPS? If	  an	  art	  of	  living	  is	  an	  ongoing	  task,	  is	  this	  commitment	  to	  always	  become	  otherwise	  also	   a	   commitment	   to	   what	   Derrida	   calls	   l’avenir,	   the	   absolute	   future	   to	   come,	   to	  which	  we	  can	  only	  say	  yes,	   ‘yes’	   to	   the	   ‘perhaps’?	   In	  discussing	  what	  comes	  before	  (but	   not	   in	   any	   temporal	   sense)	   religion	   and	   reason,	  Derrida	   paints	   this	   arresting	  image:	  ‘an	  abyss	  …	  a	  desert	  in	  a	  desert,	  there	  where	  one	  neither	  can	  nor	  should	  see	  coming	   what	   ought	   or	   could—perhaps—be	   yet	   to	   come’.39	   Might	   this	   be	   the	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pureness	  of	   the	  wait	   Foucault	   alludes	   to?	  A	   call	   for	   and	  of	   faith?	  Perhaps?	  Derrida	  says:	  This	   experience	   of	   the	   ‘perhaps’	   would	   be	   that	   of	   both	   the	   possible	   and	  impossible,	  of	  the	  possible	  as	  impossible.	  If	  all	  that	  arises	  is	  what	  is	  already	  possible,	  and	  so	  capable	  of	  being	  anticipated	  and	  expected,	   that	   is	  not	  an	  event.	  The	  event	  is	  possible	  only	  coming	  from	  the	  impossible.	  It	  arises	  like	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  impossible,	  at	  the	  point	  where	  a	  perhaps	  deprives	  us	  of	  all	  certainty	  and	  leaves	  the	  future	  to	  the	  future.	  This	  perhaps	  is	  necessarily	  allied	  to	  a	  yes:	  yes,	  yes	  to	  whoever	  or	  whatever	  comes	  about.40	  ‘Perhaps’	   bridges	   the	   space	   between	   the	   possible	   and	   the	   impossible,	   or	   what	  Caputo	  explicates	  as	  the	  future	  present	  and	  the	  absolute	  future.	  The	  future	  present	  refers	   to	   the	   momentum	   of	   the	   present	   towards	   a	   future	   we	   can	   reasonably	  anticipate;	   hence	  we	  maintain	   a	   savings	   account.	   The	   absolute	   future,	   however,	   is	  the	  unforeseeable	  future	  that	  shatters	  ‘the	  comfortable	  horizons	  of	  expectation	  that	  surround	  the	  present’.41	  Unlike	  the	  future	  present,	  it	  offers	  no	  horizon	  for	  orienting	  our	  calculations	  or	  expectations.	  The	  absolute	   future	  makes	  all	  knowledge	  of	  what	  might	  be	  possible	   impossible,	   impossible	  because	   it	   is	  wholly	  outside	   the	  order	  of	  what	   can	   be	   reasonably	   anticipated.	   Yet,	   this	   unforeseeable	   future	   to	   come	   is	   the	  condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   calculations	   or	   expectations—for	   any	   decision.	   Thus,	  every	   decision	   cannot	   but	   admit	   undecidability,	   always	   given	   up	   and	   over	   as	   a	  pledge	  (of	  faith?)	  to	  the	  absolute	  future	  to	  come,	  l’avenir,	  the	  impossible.	  The	   aporetic	   logic	   of	   l’avenir	   (and	   messianicity	   discussed	   below)	   informs	  Caputo’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  a	  ‘religious	  sense	  of	  life’	  demanding	  nothing	  less	  than	  faith,	   love,	   and	   hope.	   By	   ‘the	   religious’,	   Caputo	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   (but	   doesn’t	  exclude)	  organised	  religion.	  Rather,	  ‘the	  religious’	  refers	  to	  ‘a	  basic	  structure	  of	  our	  lives	   …	   that	   should	   be	   placed	   alongside	   very	   basic	   things,	   like	   having	   an	   artistic	  sense	  or	  political	  sense’.42	  Martin	  Hägglund	  has	  questioned	  Caputo’s	  deconstructive	  approach	   to	   ‘God’,	   arguing	   that	   he	   removes	   the	   condition	   of	   radical	   evil	   which	  Derrida	   refuses	   to	   do,	   and	   that	   his	   interpretation	   of	   ‘religion	   without	   religion’	  misreads	  Derrida’s	   ideas	  which	  point	   rather	   to	  a	   ‘radical	  atheism’.43	  This	  debate	   is	  important	   for	   clarifying	   ‘the	   religious	   turn’	   in	   critical	   thought,	   but	   it	   is	  beyond	   the	  purview	   of	   this	   essay.	   In	   any	   event,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   examined	   alongside	   ongoing	  inquiries	   into	   how	   an	   unreflexive	   deployment	   of	   a	   religion–secular	   dichotomy	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blindsides	  current	  thinking	  to	  the	  conceits	  of	  secularism,	  a	  task	  requiring	  sustained	  collective	  effort,	  as	  this	  special	  issue	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  Review	  hopes	  to	  encourage.	  I	  nevertheless	   highlight	   Hägglund’s	   quarrel	   with	   Caputo’s	   work	   to	   point	   out	   that	  radical	  atheism	  still	   involves	   faith.	  Hägglund	  himself	   says,	   ‘We	  can	  never	  know	   for	  sure	   what	   will	   happen	   because	   experience	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   unpredictable	  coming	   of	   time.	  Whatever	   we	   do,	   we	   place	   faith	   in	   a	   future	   that	  may	   shatter	   our	  hopes	  and	  lay	  waste	  what	  we	  desire.’44	  Might	  it	  be,	  then,	  that	  faith	  is	  irreducible	  to	  any	  ontotheological	  proposition,	  an	  affective	  response	  that	  reverberates	  through	  the	  hopes	   and	   aspirations	   of	   ‘believers’	   and	   ‘non-­‐believers’	   alike?	   I’ll	   return	   to	   this	  question	  later.	  Consider	  for	  the	  moment	  what	  Derrida	  says:	  My	  own	  understanding	  of	  faith	  is	  that	  there	  is	  faith	  whenever	  one	  gives	  up	  not	   only	   any	   certainty	   but	   also	   any	   determined	   hope.	   If	   one	   says	   that	  resurrection	  is	  the	  horizon	  of	  one’s	  hope	  then—since	  one	  knows	  what	  one	  names	  when	  one	   says	   ‘resurrection’—faith	   is	  not	  pure	   faith.	   It	   is	   already	  knowledge	  …	  That	  is	  why	  you	  have	  to	  be	  an	  atheist	  of	  this	  sort	  [someone	  who	   ‘rightly	   passes	   for	   an	   atheist’]	   in	   order	   to	   be	   true	   to	   faith,	   to	   pure	  faith.45	  Faith,	   in	   and	   of	   the	   ‘perhaps’,	   reverberates	   through	   my	   coterminous	   practice	   of	  Buddhism,	   poststructuralist	   thought	   and	   cultural	   studies,	   all	   of	   which	   demand	  openness	  to	  unknowingness,	  an	  openness	  enacted	  by	  both	  Derrida’s	  and	  Foucault’s	  work.	   Insofar	   as	   Foucauldian	   critique	   performs	   a	   ‘hermeneutics	   of	   refusal’	   that	  refuses	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘Who	  am	  I?’	  in	  any	  determinate	  way	  and	  challenges	  those	   who	   would	   enforce	   their	   answers	   on	   others,	   Foucault	   arguably	   shares	  Derrida’s	  appreciation	  of	  unknowingness	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  keep	  the	  future	  open.	  As	  Caputo	   suggests,	   Foucault’s	   critico-­‐political	   aims	   echo	   Derrida’s	   messianic	  affirmation	  of	  viens,	  oui,	  oui,	  come,	  yes,	  yes.46	  	  Derrida’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  messianic,	  informed	  in	  part	  and	  subversively	  by	   his	   own	   Jewish	   heritage,	   affirms	   incalculable	   alterity.	   The	   messianic	   or	  ‘messianicity	   without	   messianism’	   refers	   to	   ‘the	   opening	   to	   the	   future	   or	   to	   the	  coming	  of	  the	  other	  as	  the	  advent	  of	  justice,	  but	  without	  horizon	  of	  expectation	  and	  without	   prophetic	   prefiguration	   …	   At	   issue	   there	   is	   “a	   general	   structure	   of	  experience”.’47	  The	  messianic	  does	  not	  belong	  properly	   to	   the	  Abrahamic	   religions	  nor	   does	   it	   require	   a	   Messiah,	   for	   to	   give	   it	   specific	   content	   is	   to	   circumscribe	   it	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within	   a	   determinable	   horizon	   that	   the	   absolute	   future	   makes	   impossible.	  
Messianicity	   is	   not	   a	   horizon	   but	   the	   shattering	   of	   the	   horizon.48	   For	   Derrida,	   this	  ‘abstract	  messianicity	  belongs	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  faith,	  of	  believing,	  of	  a	  credit	  that	  is	  irreducible	  to	  knowledge	  and	  of	  a	  trust	  that	  “founds”	  all	  relation	   to	   the	   other	   in	   testimony’.49	   In	   Spectres	   of	  Marx,	   he	   speaks	   of	   the	   affinity	  between	  Marx’s	  messianic	   spirit	   and	  deconstruction’s	   affirmation	  of	   unconditional	  justice	   to	   come	   as	   ‘the	  movement	   of	   an	   experience	   open	   to	   the	   absolute	   future	   of	  what	   is	   coming,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   a	   necessarily	   indeterminate,	   abstract,	   desert-­‐like	  experience	  that	  is	  confided,	  exposed,	  given	  up	  to	  its	  waiting	  for	  the	  other	  and	  for	  the	  event’.50	  We	  return	  to	  the	  pureness	  of	  the	  wait,	  the	  desert	  in	  a	  desert:	  there	  where	  one	  neither	  can	  nor	  should	  see	  coming	  what	  ought	  or	  could—perhaps—be	  yet	  to	  come	  (where	   Derrida	   and	   Foucault	   gaze	   together	   towards	   the	   impossible	   horizon	   with	  unknowingness,	  and	  perhaps,	  faith?)	  There,	  too,	  a	  messianic	  cultural-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making	   awaits	   patiently	   as	   a	   promise,	   a	   responsible	   response	   in	   the	   face	   of	  incalculable	   alterity,	   standing	   resolute	   on	   a	   ‘double	   vector	   decision’	   involving	  attentiveness	  towards	  those	  marginalised	  others	  it	  engages	  with,	  and	  continuous	  re-­‐examination	   of	   its	   own	   commitments	   and	   exclusions.51	   An	   approach	   to	   cultural	  studies	  driven	  by	  an	  ethical	  imperative	  to	  always	  ‘start	  again’,	  as	  Goenka	  might	  say,	  implicitly	   echoes	  Derrida’s	   arguments	   about	   the	   scriptural	   story	   of	   Abraham:	   that	  the	  ‘ethical	  can	  …	  end	  up	  making	  us	  irresponsible’,	  that	  every	  response	  towards	  the	  other	  always	  sacrifices	  ‘other	  others’—tout	  autre	  est	  tout	  autre,	  every	  other	  (one)	  is	  every	  (bit)	  other.52	  Derrida	  writes:	  The	  simple	  concepts	  of	  alterity	  and	  of	  singularity	  constitute	  the	  concept	  of	  duty	   as	   much	   as	   that	   of	   responsibility.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   concepts	   of	  responsibility,	  of	  decision,	  or	  of	  duty,	  are	  condemned	  to	  paradox,	  scandal,	  and	   aporia.	   Paradox,	   scandal,	   and	   aporia	   are	   themselves	   nothing	   other	  than	   sacrifice,	   the	   exposition	   of	   conceptual	   thinking	   at	   its	   limits,	   at	   its	  death	  and	  finitude.	  As	  soon	  as	   I	  enter	   into	  a	  relation	  with	  the	  other,	  with	  the	   gaze,	   look,	   request,	   love	   command,	   or	   call	   of	   the	  other,	   I	   know	   that	   I	  can	   respond	   only	   by	   sacrificing	   ethics,	   that	   is,	   by	   sacrificing	   whatever	  obliges	  me	  also	  to	  respond,	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  in	  the	  same	  instant,	  to	  all	  the	  others.53	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If	   responsibility	   always	   involves	   ‘irresponsibilisation’,	   then	   any	   ethical	   or	   political	  decision	   cannot	   be	   taken	   once	   and	   for	   all	   but	   must	   be	   continuously	   reviewed,	  retaken.54	  As	  Derrida	   says,	   ‘there	  would	  be	  no	  decision,	   in	   the	   strong	   sense	  of	   the	  word,	   in	   ethics,	   in	   politics,	   no	   decision,	   and	   thus	   no	   responsibility,	   without	   the	  experience	  of	  some	  undecidability	  …	  a	  decision	  has	  to	  go	  through	  some	  impossibility	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  a	  decision.’55	  Hence,	  cultural	  studies	  as	  a	  messianic	  project	  has	  to	  constantly	  double	  back	  on	  undecidability,	  returning	  again	  and	  again	  to	  the	  pureness	  of	   the	   wait,	   the	   desert	   in	   a	   desert:	   there	   where	   one	   neither	   can	   nor	   should	   see	  coming	  what	  ought	  or	  could—perhaps—be	  yet	  to	  come.	  ‘Perhaps’—traces	   of	   which	   mark	   this	   profession,	   traversing	   the	   art	   of	   living,	  
anicca,	   anattā,	   mindfulness,	   waiting,	   l’avenir,	   messianicity,	   come,	   yes,	   yes—may	  perhaps	  be	  the	  most	  responsible	  response:	  ‘There	  is	  no	  future	  and	  no	  relation	  to	  the	  coming	   of	   the	   event	   without	   experience	   of	   the	   “perhaps”.’56	   A	  messianic	   cultural-­‐studies-­‐in-­‐the-­‐making	   would	   strive	   to	   take	   into	   account	   ‘the	   whole	   spectrum	   of	  possibilities	  and	  occurrences,	   the	  horizon	  of	  which	   is	   always	  partially	  occluded	  by	  what	   we	   could	   describe	   as	   the	   “spectre	   of	   the	   perhaps”’.57	   This	   is	   important:	  
embracing	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  perhaps	  does	  not	  imply	  paralysis.	  As	  Derrida	  says,	  ‘If	   no	   decision	   (ethical,	   juridical,	   political)	   is	   possible	   without	   interrupting	  determination	   by	   engaging	   oneself	   in	   the	   perhaps	   …	   the	   same	   decision	   must	  interrupt	   the	   very	   thing	   that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility:	   the	   perhaps	   itself.’58	  Zylinska	  thus	  argues	  that	  cultural	  studies	  has	  to	  ‘remain	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  its	  pervertibility,	   collapse,	   annihilation,	   and	   withering	   down’,	   and	   inasmuch	   as	   its	  ethical	   engagement	   is	   performative,	   our	   critico-­‐political	   interventions	   (academic	  publications	  and	  conferences,	  engagements	  with	  consumer	  practices,	  cultural	  policy	  studies	   and	   so	   on)	   have	   to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   a	   form	   of	   delay	   or	   deferral,	   an	  openness	   to	   the	   unknown.59	   This	   invitation	   to	   openness	   recalls	   the	   arts	   of	   living	  where	   delay	   or	   deferral	   accompanies	   and	   sustains	   the	   pursuit	   of	   freedom,	   which	  embraces	  the	  unknown	  to	  perform	  the	  possibility	  for	  new	  sociopolitical	  choices	  and	  relations,	  for	  becoming	  otherwise,	  for	  Awakening.	  Zylinska	  writes:	  It	   is	   in	   this	   very	   openness	   to	   the	   unknown,	   to	   the	   forms	   of	   political	  engagement	   that	   cannot	   yet	   perhaps	   be	   described	   in	   the	   language	   of	  cultural	   theory,	   sociology,	   ethnography	   or	   any	   other	   more	   established	  disciplinary	  discourses,	   that	   cultural	   studies	  becomes	   intrinsically	  ethical	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…	  For	  Derrida	  messianic	  politics	  constitute	  a	  viable	  political	  option	  arising	  out	   of	   the	   renunciation	   of	   a	   desire	   to	   rule,	   control	   and	   master;	   it	   is	   a	  politics	  which	  does	  not	  compromise	  its	  commitment	  even	  if	  it	  does	  leave	  a	  specific	   agenda	  behind.	  What	  we	   are	   left	  with	   are	   ‘ways	  of	   respecting	  or	  greeting	  what	  remains	  to	  come—a	  future	  of	  which	  we	  know	  nothing.	  What	  comes	  will	  never	  belong	  to	  the	  order	  of	  knowledge	  or	  fore-­‐knowledge’.60	  We	  return	  yet	  again	  to	  the	  pureness	  of	  the	  wait,	  the	  desert	  in	  a	  desert:	  there	  where	  one	   neither	   can	   nor	   should	   see	   coming	  what	   ought	   or	   could—perhaps—be	   yet	   to	  come.	  A	  call	   for	  and	  of	   faith?	  Perhaps,	   ‘faith	  without	  faith’,	  where	   ‘undecidability	   is	  the	  first,	  last	  and	  constant,	  the	  element,	  the	  space	  in	  which	  faith	  makes	  its	  leap,	  the	  horizon	   in	   terms	  of	  which	   faith	  understands	   its	   limits,	   understands	   that	   it	   is	   faith,	  through	  a	  trace	  darkly’?61	  	  My	   coterminous	   practice	   of	   Buddhism,	   poststructuralist	   thought	   and	   cultural	  studies	  has	  made	   this	  question	  of	   faith	   impossible	   to	   ignore,	   impossible	  not	   to	  say	  yes,	   yes	   to	   the	   perhaps,	   not	   if	   I	  wish	   to	  maintain	   fidelity	   to	   undecidability,	  anicca,	  impermanence,	  change,	  which	  admittedly	  can	  and	  has	  aroused	   fear	  and	  trembling;	  but	   I	  cannot	  keep	  silent	  because	   it	  also	  arouses,	  perhaps	   it	   is	  even	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for,	  trust,	  confidence,	  hope,	  and	  yes,	  love.	  Consider	  this	  leitmotif—?!?!?!—in	  Thai	  Buddhist	  artist,	  the	  late	  Montien	  Boonma’s	  work.	  Boonma,	  who	  lost	  his	  wife	  to	   breast	   cancer	   in	   1994	   and	   succumbed	   to	   brain	   tumour	   himself	   in	   2000,	  confronted	  through	  his	  art	  dukkha,	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  life	  that	  is	  anicca.	  ?!?!?!	  (the	  interrobang)	   was	   even	   plastered	   on	   the	   walls	   of	   his	   dying	   wife’s	   hospital	   room,	  representing	   his	   experience	   of	   Buddhist	   meditation,	   of	   the	   unknown,	   surprise,	  discovery,	  hope—the	  movement	  of	  faith:	  The	   question	   mark	   is	   the	   symbol	   of	   the	   unknown	   realisable	   through	  meditation.	   The	   spiral	   shape	   of	   the	   question	   mark	   represents	   the	  movement	   from	   the	   outer	   to	   the	   inner	   (and	   vice	   versa)	   achieved	   by	  concentration.	  When	  we	  grasp	  the	  unknown,	  we	  feel	  it	  but	  cannot	  express	  it.	   The	   exclamation	   mark	   is	   a	   symbol	   of	   this	   feeling	   of	   realisation.	   I	  perceived	  a	  gap	  between	  these	  two	  ...	  the	  question	  and	  the	  response	  these	  ...	  two	  are	  never	  ending.	  A	  response	  can	  turn	  into	  the	  subsequent	  question.	  It’s	  like	  our	  mind.62	  ?!?!?!...	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My	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  make	  claims	  about	  the	  unknown	  that	  is	  realisable	  by	  the	  mind	  but	   to	  propose	   that	   faith	   is,	   to	  paraphrase	  Boonma,	  what	  we	   feel	  but	   cannot	  ever	  fully	  express.	  Given	  the	  inroads	  made	  into	  the	  study	  of	  affect	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  could	   this	   be	   one	  way	   forward:	   to	   investigate	   faith	   as	   something	   felt,	   of	   the	   non-­‐rational	   (which	   is	  not	   to	   say	   irrational)	   in	   tension	  with—or	  perhaps	   in	   a	  mutually	  
supportive	   relationship	  with—the	   rational?	   This	   suggestion	   is	   prompted	   partly	   by	  my	   experience	   of	   Buddhist	   soteriology	   as	   an	   ongoing	   process	   of	   embodying	   ‘in-­‐between-­‐ness’,	   which	   coincides	   with	   the	   characterisation	   of	   affect	   as	   ‘born	   in	   in-­‐between-­‐ness’;63	   and	   partly	   by	   Brian	  Massumi’s	   observation	   that	   ‘faith’	   forms	   the	  ‘ultimate	   foundation	   of	   the	   capitalist	   monetary	   system’.64	   Investigating	   faith	   with	  affect	  theory	  could	  therefore	  not	  only	  illuminate	  the	  affective	  dynamics	  of	  religious	  commitment	   and	   spiritual	   pursuit,	   but	   also	   uncover	   new	   strategies	   for	   contesting	  neoliberal	  politics,	  which	  arguably	   functions	   like	  a	  religion	  of	   the	  market.	  To	  again	  evoke	  Redden’s	  essay,	  how,	  for	  example,	  might	  we	  investigate	  the	  question	  of	  faith	  within	   the	   context	   of	  New	  Age	   spirituality,	   and	  what	  might	   the	   question	   elucidate	  about	  its	  affective	  economy?	  Such	  a	  critical	  hospitality	  towards	  spiritual	  knowledge	  practices	   and	   faith	   performs	   a	   double	   vector	   decision,	   a	   responsible	   response	  towards	  this	  ‘other’	  that	  is	  religion	  and	  cultural	  studies’	  ‘long-­‐standing	  commitment	  to	   the	   applied	   critique	   of	   the	   social	   and	   political	   effects	   of	   a	   market	   economy’,	   a	  commitment	  which,	  Graeme	  Turner	  argues,	  ought	   to	   remain	  a	   foundational	   stance	  even	  as	  we	  explore	  how	  the	  ever-­‐proliferating	  products	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  market	  might	  empower	   individuals.	  At	   the	  very	   least,	   I’d	  suggest	   that	   this	  broadly	  Marxist	  commitment	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  central	  axis	  for	  orienting	  the	  general	  task	  of	  responding	  to	  difference.65	  	  
Faith	  as	  an	  affective	  response	  born	  in	  in-­between-­ness?	  This	  inquiry	  is	  certainly	  pertinent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Vipassana	   as	   it	   prioritises	   vedanā.	   But	   it	   could	   also	   be	  explored	   in	   the	   contexts	   of	   other	   religions	   or	   spiritualities	   and	   even	   nonreligious	  contexts	   like	  academia,	  where	   faith	  may	  very	  well	  be	   the	   ‘ultimate	  glue’	   that	  holds	  together	   our	   hopes	   and	   aspirations	   as	  we	   engage	   in	   the	   (endless?!?!?!)	   pursuit	   of	  understanding,	  helping	  us	  adhere	  to	  our	  ethico-­‐political	  commitments	  with	   fidelity,	  with	   trust	   and	   confidence	   in	   our	   practice,	   vocation,	   craft,	   calling:	   our	   profession.	  Perhaps	  this	  could	  be	  one	  way	  of	  redressing	  the	  neglect	  of	  faith	  in	  cultural	  studies,	  if	  not	  the	  academy	  more	  generally?	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In	  conclusion,	  I	  offer	  Boonma’s	  motif	  as	  a	  visual	  metaphor	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  thought,	   a	   ceaselessly	   differing	   and	  deferring	   trail	   of	   ?!?!?!	   that	   always	   keeps	   faith	  with	  undecidability,	   the	  perhaps.	   ?!?!?!	  represents	   the	  profession	  I’m	  making	   in	   the	  name	   of	   ‘cultural	   studies’,	   a	   promise,	   a	   messianic	   project	   ‘which	   renounces	   the	  desire	  to	  know,	  to	  close	  off	  dissensus,	  to	  erase	  incalculable	  alterity,	  but	  which	  does	  not	   at	   the	   same	   time	   sidestep	   its	   political	   commitment,	   presents	   itself	   as	   both	   an	  ethical	   possibility	   and	   a	   responsibility’.66	   This	   is	   my	   profession	   of	   faith.	   This	  profession,	  I	  accept,	  remains	  indeterminate,	  uncertain.	  But	  perhaps	  this	  is	  precisely	  why	  it	  is	  a	  profession	  of	  faith?!?!?!	  I	  do	  not	  pretend	  to	  have	  my	  finger	  on	  faith,	  quite	  impossible	   to	   speak	   about,	  much	   less	   know.	   I	   thus	  offer	   this	   profession	  of	   faith	   to	  you,	  whom	  I	  can	  only	  ever	  address	  in	  good	  faith,	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	  ponder	  together	  on	   the	   ‘perhaps’,	  which,	   I	   believe,	  we	   (forgive	  me	   for	   being	  presumptuous)	   cannot	  but	  feel	  in	  this	  profession,	  in	  this	  very	  life.	  	  Yours	  faithfully.	  	   —	  	  Edwin	   Ng	   works	   in	   the	   School	   of	   Communication	   and	   Creative	   Arts	   at	   Deakin	  University.	  His	   current	   research	  performs	  autoethnographical	   investigations	  of	  his	  coterminous	  practice	  of	  Buddhism	  and	  cultural	  research	  so	  as	  to	  explore	  hospitable	  encounters	   between	   sacred	   and	   scholarly	   traditions,	   and	   to	   interrogate	   ethico-­‐political	  debates	  about	  religion,	  spirituality,	  and	  the	  role	  of	   faith	  in	  cultural	  studies	  and	  micropolitics	  more	  generally.	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